The multiparty contest for 301 constituency-based seats, and the period of unfettered public debate and discussion that preceded it, represents the advent of organized mass pol? itics in a region where political power has long remained a closely-held family affair. In the weeks after Yemenis Sheila Carapico, an editor of this magazine, teaches international relations at the University of Richmond in Virginia. She is currently in Yemen on a Fulbright grant, researching political developments since unification.
went to the polls, the regime next door in Saudi Arabia sent armed police to raid a university campus in Riyadh and arrest a professor active in a banned human rights committee. These and other developments in the region may compel the Clinton administration to weigh its democ? ratization rhetoric a little more seriously. When a high- ly and most restrictions on association, expression and movement were lifted. The 1991 referendum specified that the elections be held within 30 months of unification, but a combination of technical problems, procrastination and conflicts between "Ali and Ali" (Salih and al-Bayd) post? poned polling beyond the November 1992 deadline.
In the months before April, a multiparty Supreme Elections Committee (SEC) drew up 301 districts and estab? lished procedures for voter and candidate registration, a 10-day campaign period, write-in ballots, and counting procedures.2 In early 1993, 2.7 million adults (including 77 percent of eligible males and 15 percent of eligible females) registered to vote. Some 4,800 candidates regis? tered, the majority of them independents.3 More than 3,600, including 50 women, stayed in the campaign until the end.
Political Space
How did it happen that two erstwhile dictators presided over relatively fair, peaceful multiparty elections?
The answer lies mainly in the conditions that led to uni? fication. The end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet assistance so essential to the PDRY's survival, and reduced Western and Gulf interests in sustaining inter-Yemeni tensions. Dissidents from each polity had sought refuge in the others' capital, and most independent political move? ments, organizations and unions were committed to unity. Planners looked to recent oil discoveries along their com? mon frontier to bring in foreign investment and exchange. In short, realizing that in order to maintain power they would have to share power, Ali and Ali agreed not only to merge their polities but to open up the process to wider participation. 4 The process had some unique facilitating features. Unlike other "democratizing" systems, Yemen inherited two ruling parties that shared power in a delicate, often tense balance during the transitional period, each retain? ing control of its former military and security apparatus- Party is a marriage of convenience between Shaikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, the head of the powerful Hashid con? federation, and the urban-based Muslim Brotherhood. In 1991, the Isiah had led an unsuccessful boycott of the 1991 constitutional referendum because the shari'a is stip? ulated simply as "the main" rather than "the only" source of legislation. The Iraqi-leaning Yemeni Ba'th is much smaller in numbers, but also wields some influence in trib? al and military circles through its charismatic leader, Mujahid Abu Shuarib. 5 The most important among some 40 other parties are three Nasirist factions; a sayyid* group known as al-Haq (Right); Omar al-Jawi's progressive Unionist Party; and the League of the Sons of Yemen led by Abd al-Rahman al-Jifri. Some smaller parties, unable to field a full slate and obtain state campaign financing, ran candidates as "independents."
Despite instances of disorder and violence, and scores of complaints, the outcome indicated a genuine contest. The GPC won 123 constituencies;
Isiah came in second with 62 seats, mostly from its tribal rather than its Islamist wing; the YSP took 57, mostly in the former PDRY; inde? pendents won 47; the Ba'th seven; three Nasirist parties each gained one seat; al-Haq won two, and one district's election was postponed.6 The YSP claimed that in addition to 57 party members, 13 independent socialists won with its support, and an additional 17 genuinely independent deputies-elect share its vision of the future.7 Some spec? ulated that Isiah, which declined to estimate its unofficial sympathizers, had 30 supporters who won under the GPC banner, plus three independents. By any count, the arith? metic mandated a coalition government.8
Domestic Pressures
Arab leaders have promised free elections in the past and not delivered. What made Salih and al-Bayd?neither of whose personal histories indicates a commitment to polit? ical liberalism?follow through? The answer lies in soci? etal pressures which took different forms: mass confer? ences, strikes, demonstrations, political organizations, press commentaries, academic symposia and maqiyal or "salons."
Prior to the elections, a series of mass conferences pro? vided outlets for articulate opposition elements. A nineday Talahum (Cohesion) Conference in December 1991, gathered some 10,000 men; although its banner was the * Sayyid (plural sadah) refers to persons claiming descent from Muhammad, the prophet, who comprised a ruling aristocracy in North Yemen prior to the 1962 revolution.
Bakil tribal confederation, urban intellectuals were among the organizers and authors of a 33-point resolution calling for judicial independence, strengthening of representative parliamentary and local bodies, fiscal restraint and man? agement, revitalization of agricultural and services.cooperatives, an independent media, environmental protec? tion, free elections within the mandated time-frame, peaceful resolution of tribal conflicts, and other reforms.9 Some seven other tribe-based but civic-oriented mass con? ferences in 1992 each issued written demands for the rule of law, pluralism, economic development and local autonomy. The Saba' (Sheba) Conference of Bakil and Madhaj tribes elected a council of trustees, a council of social reform, and follow-up committees to ensure insti? tutional continuity.
This activity culminated with a national conference of representatives of the smaller center and left parties and political organizations, led by Omar al-Jawi. This time, the two ruling parties strove to delay, discourage, coopt and eventually offset what promised to be a major event by holding a simultaneous counter-conference and by
arranging the ouster of their opponents from the San'a Cultural Center to the local Sheraton. Well-publicized in the opposition press but ignored by the official media, the center-left conference criticized delayed preparations for the elections and the government's reckless printing of money, and proposed a code of political conduct for polit? ical parties.10 The Ta'iz Conference in November 1992, headed by al-Jifri, went even further in attracting facul?
ty, journalists and professionals; challenging Ta'iz's gov? ernor; constituting steering and work councils; and artic? ulating explicit demands for civic and human rights, local elections, and improved local services.11 Not to be outdone, the Isiah organized a 4,000-strong Unity and Peace Conference in December under the slogan "The Quran and the Sunna Supersede the Constitution and the Law."12 These conferences, both tribal and urban-based, involv?
ing tens of thousands of people, were among the transition period's most important political developments. In response, the regime felt compelled to adopt its own code of politi? cal conduct, dismiss the Ta'iz governor, accept the princi?
ple of local elections, and adopt a rhetoric of electoral rights. There were also several outbursts of popular frustra?
tion, most notably in December 1992. Outrage with the collapse of the value of the riyal, inadequate services, mount? ing unemployment, government corruption and post? ponement of the elections erupted in mass demonstrations against both the state and private merchants in all major cities. Along with strikes and threatened strikes by groups ranging from garbage collectors to judges, the near-riots reminded the government of the power of popular wrath.
On a smaller scale but a more institutionalized basis, numerous independent political organizations emerged. The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties, established by liberal university professors, ini? tiated the National Committee for Free Elections (NCFE), in turn spurring the formation of other electoral NGOs.
Although they failed on their own terms to guarantee the integrity of the balloting process, they did perform a mod? est watchdog function and met again after the elections to prepare for the next round. Syndicates, charities and inter? est groups have been increasingly active.
The press is also significant within the political arena. More than 100 partisan and independent newspapers and magazines, mostly founded since 1990, covered these events. Although the government daily, Al-Thawra, and state-run television and radio tend to dominate news cov? erage, a number of opposition weeklies have a strong read? ership among the literate, urban, politically active popu? lation: Sawt al-(Ummal (Voice of the Workers), based in Aden, has the largest circulation of any paper. Party organs, includingRaay, Al-Tashih, Al-Sahwa and others, provide critical commentary and information about opposition con? ferences and independent organizations. There has emerged a press corps of scores of men and several dozen women who more and more approximate a fourth estate, conducting interviews, attending parliament, asking critical questions at press conferences, testing the limits of press law and defending one another against lawsuits. 13 Related to the mass conferences, political organizing and press activity was a trend toward academic symposia on topics such as the constitutional amendments, admin? istrative decentralization, municipal services, and the cam? paign experience of women candidates. Typically invit? ing members of each party and independent specialists, such symposia, virtually unheard of in the old North or South Yemen, provided fora for discussion, debate and refinement of ideas which were then reported in the oppo? sition press. More frequent and informal is an updated variation on the male qat session, or maqiyal, which approximates the "salons" of 19th-century Europe.14 Nowadays these customarily informal social gatherings may elect a chair, select a topic, establish rules of order, and hold organized political discussion on topics ranging from relations with the Gulf to women's rights to exchange rate policy.
Collectively, these civic activities applied consider? able pressure on the regime to fulfill its promises, abide by a code of conduct, address its critics and respect political pluralism. Several Yemeni intellectuals have criticized international observers and reporters for presenting an unduly positive picture of the electoral experience, and many participants in the conferences and seminars are quite cynical about their own influence, insisting that they have been marginalized from the political process. By the same token, it is difficult to imagine the events of the past year taking place had they been passive.
External Involvement
Rumors in San'a had the US playing a major if covert role in organizing the elections and the post-electoral com?
promise. There is scant evidence, though, of Western pres? sure for political liberalization in Arabia. Although USYemeni relations seemed poised to improve immediately after unification in May 1990, they deteriorated after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait because, in the words of US Ambassador Arthur Hughes, "San'a wanted to maintain normal rela? tions with Baghdad."15 American aid, never monetarily significant, was slashed from $30 million to $3 million, and Agency for International Development (AID) direct-hire staff reduced from 19 to four or five.
Unity and electoral democracy have never been high on the US agenda for the Arabian Peninsula. Washington habitually defers to Saudi perceptions. James Schelsinger, former CIA director and secretary of defense and a man with some experience in setting the US strategic agenda in the Middle East, asked recently "whether we seriously desire or prescribe democracy as the proper form of government for other societies. Perhaps the issue is most clearly posed in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the institutions of Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no.... jects had minimal effect. IFES was still conducting train? ing on the eve of the elections, using a syllabus their own team leader considered inadequate.
IRI's team of inter? national observers included few Arabic speakers. Even the US Republicans could not overcome neighboring Arab states' reluctance to have their citizens observe the process. The IRI team included one person from the United Arab Emirates and a Bahraini who arrived on a tourist visa. NDI's plan to organize volunteer Yemeni monitors for each of the 7,000 polling stations was a fiasco, and illustrated the NDI's lack of familiarity with an Arab environment. 20 US press coverage was favorable, as were the reports of these US and international observer groups. But
Washington's reaction was qualified by an obvious concern that pluralism not spread to other parts of the Peninsula. A general eight-point government program, whose most sensitive proposal concerned the long-delayed merger of the two armies, was put to parliament for a vote of confi? dence in early July.26 But just when bargaining and com? promises seemed to produce a workable coalition, the deputies balked. For more than a week in late July and early August, al-Ahmar pounded his gavel in a vain attempt to restore order as a raucous debate raged over the pro? gram, the constitutional amendments, the composition of the Presidential Council, and unification of the armed forces. After an alternative program drafted by parlia? mentary committee was presented, 260 deputies demand? ed to address the floor, threatening to drag on the debate endlessly. Finally a vote of confidence on the program passed on the implicit premise that the substance of the debate would be deferred to deliberations on the consti? tutional amendments package. As the Chamber went into recess in early August, the Isiah and the Socialists were each threatening to withdraw from the coalition unless their respective demands for shari'a law and the vice pres? idency were met.
When parliament reconvened in September, a threeparty committee was formed to discuss the proposed con? stitutional amendments, now revised to concentrate more power in the hands of the chief executive. Critics, includ? ing the newly-formed opposition coalition of five small par? ties, many Socialists, and independent intellectuals, con? tended that the current constitution has not yet been implemented, and that the continuing focus on the com? position of government institutions only served to divert attention away from a deepening economic crisis which promises to grow more acute as a World Bank-IMF struc? tural adjustment program is put into effect. Popular rat? ification of the political establishment has not diminished profound disagreements over basic issues of governance and accountability, and more than a few thoughtful Yemenis fear that even the startling accomplishments of the last several years?unification and participatory pol? itics?remain vulnerable to hostile forces in the country and in the region.
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